docs: align tool inventory with what actually runs (no Grype, no ZAP/nuclei) #233

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sharang merged 2 commits from docs/tool-inventory-drift into main 2026-08-31 15:58:13 +00:00
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Control mapping connects the scanner's raw output — deterministic tool finding
The design has one rule, borrowed from the ZeroFalse / IRIS line of research: **deterministic tools are the detectors; the LLM is only ever a grounded false-positive filter, never the thing that finds the issue.**
- A tool (semgrep, gitleaks, syft/osv, the DAST agents, the PLC linter) detects deterministically.
- A tool (semgrep, gitleaks, syft/osv, the PLC linter; the DAST agents today, with **Nuclei and ZAP planned** as deterministic web/OT detectors underneath them — see [Tools & Scanners](/reference/tools#planned-integrations-decided-2026-08-31-not-yet-in-the-code)) detects.
- An **authored, human-reviewed lookup table** (`control-map`) maps that detection to the control(s) it's evidence for.
- The LLM enters last, to *confirm or refute* the mapping against the actual code — and every surviving verdict is anchored to a verbatim snippet by the grounding gate.
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@@ -92,3 +92,7 @@ Filters can be combined. A count indicator shows how many findings match the cur
::: tip
Findings marked as **Confirmed** exploitable were verified with a successful attack payload. **Unconfirmed** findings show suspicious behavior that may indicate a vulnerability but could not be fully exploited.
:::
## Deterministic detectors (planned)
The DAST engine above is agentic: an LLM drives crawler, browser and testing tools and decides what to try next. That gives depth and code-aware exploitation, but not run-to-run reproducibility. The next step (decided 2026-08-31, not yet implemented) adds two deterministic open-source detectors **under** the agents: **Nuclei** (template checks incl. ICS/OT and default-credential templates) first, then an **OWASP ZAP** baseline scan. Their findings will appear alongside agent findings, carry CWE + compliance `control_refs`, and seed the agent's context so it verifies and chains instead of rediscovering. See [Tools & Scanners](/reference/tools#planned-integrations-decided-2026-08-31-not-yet-in-the-code).
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@@ -96,3 +96,14 @@ When you mark findings as false positives or provide developer feedback, this in
::: tip
The AI triage is a starting point, not a final verdict. Always review the rationale and code evidence before acting on a finding. See [Understanding Findings](/guide/findings#human-in-the-loop) for more on the human-in-the-loop workflow.
:::
## Planned integrations (decided 2026-08-31, not yet in the code)
The product spec keeps an **OSS-only** tooling policy and a control-mapping rule of *tools detect, the LLM judges*. Two deterministic detectors are therefore being added **underneath** the agentic DAST/pentest layer — the agents stay on top for context-seeded exploitation, chaining and explanation:
| Tool | Role | Status |
|------|------|--------|
| [Nuclei](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei) | Template-driven checks (CVE probes, default credentials, exposed panels, misconfigurations) including ICS/OT templates for WebVisu / OpenPLC / HMI endpoints. Runs as a DAST phase and as a Werkbank job with vendored templates so it works on-prem. | Planned — tracked as an issue |
| [OWASP ZAP](https://www.zaproxy.org/) | Baseline (passive) and, behind the destructive-tests flag, active scan for reproducible spider + rule coverage; results seed the pentest agent. | Planned — follows Nuclei |
Both feed the same `control-map` lookup table as Semgrep, so their findings receive compliance `control_refs` through the grounded judge. An **offline vulnerability database** (Trivy preferred, Grype as alternative) is planned for the on-prem Werkbank runner, which cannot reach the OSV.dev / NVD APIs. Until these land, DAST findings come exclusively from the in-house agents described above.