feat(auth): membership authority endpoint + fail-closed API auth (RBAC Phase 1)

GET /v1/users/{id}/memberships answers 'which tenants does this JWT
subject belong to, with which org_roles and entitlements' (ratified
auth design, model B2). Keycloak supplies user->tenant links and roles
via the Adapter (attribute projection until the realm migrates to
Organizations); registered tenants override status/plan/products from
registry tables.

New internal/authn verifies Keycloak bearer tokens (OIDC discovery +
JWKS, audience AUTH_EXPECTED_AUDIENCE, default tenant-registry). With
AUTH_ENABLED=true all routes except /healthz + /readyz require a token
and the server refuses to start if the verifier cannot initialize;
false (dev default) keeps the API open. Completes the M5.2-deferred
org_roles lookup and replaces the 'M4.3 adds JWT validation' TODO in
the spec.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

cmd/server/main.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
 
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/authn"
 	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/config"
 	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/keycloak"
 	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/server"
@@ -59,7 +60,21 @@ func main() {
 		kc = keycloak.NewMock()
 	}
 
-	handler := server.NewRouter(&server.Server{Cfg: cfg, Log: logger, Store: s, Keycloak: kc})
+	var av *authn.Verifier
+	if cfg.AuthEnabled {
+		av, err = authn.New(bootCtx, cfg.KeycloakIssuer, cfg.AuthAudience)
+		if err != nil {
+			// Fail closed: never start an "authenticated" server that
+			// cannot actually verify tokens.
+			slog.Error("AUTH_CONFIG_INCOMPLETE — AUTH_ENABLED=true but verifier init failed", "err", err)
+			os.Exit(1)
+		}
+		slog.Info("api auth enabled", "issuer", cfg.KeycloakIssuer, "audience", cfg.AuthAudience)
+	} else {
+		slog.Warn("AUTH_ENABLED=false — API is unauthenticated (dev only)")
+	}
+
+	handler := server.NewRouter(&server.Server{Cfg: cfg, Log: logger, Store: s, Keycloak: kc, Auth: av})
 	srv := &http.Server{
 		Addr:         cfg.Addr,
 		Handler:      handler,

go.mod

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ module gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry
 go 1.25.0
 
 require (
+	github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.20.0
 	github.com/getkin/kin-openapi v0.138.0
+	github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4
 	github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4 v4.19.1
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
 	github.com/jackc/pgerrcode v0.0.0-20250907135507-afb5586c32a6
@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ require (
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.41.0 // indirect
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric v1.41.0 // indirect
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.41.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.44.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/text v0.37.0 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ github.com/containerd/log v0.1.0 h1:TCJt7ioM2cr/tfR8GPbGf9/VRAX8D2B4PjzCpfX540I=
 github.com/containerd/log v0.1.0/go.mod h1:VRRf09a7mHDIRezVKTRCrOq78v577GXq3bSa3EhrzVo=
 github.com/containerd/platforms v0.2.1 h1:zvwtM3rz2YHPQsF2CHYM8+KtB5dvhISiXh5ZpSBQv6A=
 github.com/containerd/platforms v0.2.1/go.mod h1:XHCb+2/hzowdiut9rkudds9bE5yJ7npe7dG/wG+uFPw=
+github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.20.0 h1:EtE0WIBHk03N+DqGkY4+UONzzZHk7amKt6IyNd7OsZE=
+github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.20.0/go.mod h1:DYCf24+ncYi+XkIH97GY1+dqoRlbaSI26KVTCI9SrY4=
 github.com/cpuguy83/dockercfg v0.3.2 h1:DlJTyZGBDlXqUZ2Dk2Q3xHs/FtnooJJVaad2S9GKorA=
 github.com/cpuguy83/dockercfg v0.3.2/go.mod h1:sugsbF4//dDlL/i+S+rtpIWp+5h0BHJHfjj5/jFyUJc=
 github.com/creack/pty v1.1.24 h1:bJrF4RRfyJnbTJqzRLHzcGaZK1NeM5kTC9jGgovnR1s=
@@ -43,6 +45,8 @@ github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4 h1:NFTV2Zj1bL4mc9sqWACXbQFVBBg2W3GPvqp8/ESS2
 github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4/go.mod h1:m8KPJKqk1gH5J9DgRY2ASl2lWCfGKXixSwevea8zH2U=
 github.com/getkin/kin-openapi v0.138.0 h1:ebfE0JAmF6AqHrNBy1KO3Fs68K9tPs48HalvLPo7Rv4=
 github.com/getkin/kin-openapi v0.138.0/go.mod h1:vUYWaKyMqj7PfTybelXtLuLN9tReS12vxnzMRK+z2GY=
+github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4 h1:moDMcTHmvE6Groj34emNPLs/qtYXRVcd6S7NHbHz3kA=
+github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4/go.mod h1:x4oUasVrzR7071A4TnHLGSPpNOm2a21K9Kf04k1rs08=
 github.com/go-logr/logr v1.2.2/go.mod h1:jdQByPbusPIv2/zmleS9BjJVeZ6kBagPoEUsqbVz/1A=
 github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.3 h1:CjnDlHq8ikf6E492q6eKboGOC0T8CDaOvkHCIg8idEI=
 github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.3/go.mod h1:9T104GzyrTigFIr8wt5mBrctHMim0Nb2HLGrmQ40KvY=
@@ -179,6 +183,8 @@ go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.41.0 h1:Vbk2co6bhj8L59ZJ6/xFTskY+tGAbOnCtQGVVa
 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.41.0/go.mod h1:U1NU4ULCoxeDKc09yCWdWe+3QoyweJcISEVa1RBzOis=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.51.0 h1:IBPXwPfKxY7cWQZ38ZCIRPI50YLeevDLlLnyC5wRGTI=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.51.0/go.mod h1:8AdwkbraGNABw2kOX6YFPs3WM22XqI4EXEd8g+x7Oc8=
+golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0 h1:peZ/1z27fi9hUOFCAZaHyrpWG5lwe0RJEEEeH0ThlIs=
+golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0/go.mod h1:YDBUJMTkDnJS+A4BP4eZBjCqtokkg1hODuPjwiGPO7Q=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 h1:e0PTpb7pjO8GAtTs2dQ6jYa5BWYlMuX047Dco/pItO4=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190916202348-b4ddaad3f8a3/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=

internal/authn/authn.go

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// Package authn validates Keycloak-issued bearer tokens for the
+// tenant-registry API (RBAC rollout Phase 1; fail-closed per the ratified
+// compliance auth design, model B2).
+//
+// The package only verifies — issuer, signature via JWKS, expiry, and
+// audience. It deliberately does not authorize: tenant-registry IS the
+// membership authority, so its callers are services (INTERNAL_SERVICE_ONLY
+// posture) holding client_credentials tokens whose audience includes
+// AUTH_EXPECTED_AUDIENCE.
+package authn
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
+)
+
+// ErrNoToken means the Authorization header was absent or not a Bearer
+// scheme. Handlers map it to 401 TOKEN_MISSING.
+var ErrNoToken = errors.New("authorization header missing or not Bearer")
+
+// Principal is the verified caller identity, placed in the request context
+// so handlers (and, later, audit writes) can attribute actions.
+type Principal struct {
+	Subject  string // JWT sub — the Keycloak user or service-account id
+	ClientID string // JWT azp — which OAuth client obtained the token
+	Issuer   string
+}
+
+type ctxKey struct{}
+
+// WithPrincipal returns ctx carrying p.
+func WithPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p *Principal) context.Context {
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, ctxKey{}, p)
+}
+
+// PrincipalFrom extracts the verified principal, if any.
+func PrincipalFrom(ctx context.Context) (*Principal, bool) {
+	p, ok := ctx.Value(ctxKey{}).(*Principal)
+	return p, ok
+}
+
+// Verifier checks bearer tokens against one issuer + audience. A nil
+// *Verifier means auth is disabled (AUTH_ENABLED=false) and the server
+// passes requests through unauthenticated.
+type Verifier struct {
+	issuer   string
+	verifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
+}
+
+// New performs OIDC discovery against issuer and prepares JWKS-backed
+// verification. Callers must treat an error as fatal when AUTH_ENABLED=true
+// (AUTH_CONFIG_INCOMPLETE — refuse to start, never fall open).
+func New(ctx context.Context, issuer, audience string) (*Verifier, error) {
+	if issuer == "" || audience == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("issuer and audience are required")
+	}
+	provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, issuer)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc discovery for %s: %w", issuer, err)
+	}
+	return &Verifier{
+		issuer:   issuer,
+		verifier: provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: audience}),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Verify checks the raw Authorization header value and returns the caller
+// principal. Signature, issuer, expiry, and audience are all enforced by
+// the underlying oidc verifier.
+func (v *Verifier) Verify(ctx context.Context, authorization string) (*Principal, error) {
+	raw, ok := strings.CutPrefix(authorization, "Bearer ")
+	if !ok || strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
+		return nil, ErrNoToken
+	}
+	tok, err := v.verifier.Verify(ctx, strings.TrimSpace(raw))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var claims struct {
+		Azp string `json:"azp"`
+	}
+	_ = tok.Claims(&claims) // azp is informational; absence is not an error
+	return &Principal{Subject: tok.Subject, ClientID: claims.Azp, Issuer: tok.Issuer}, nil
+}

internal/authn/authn_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+package authn_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	jose "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
+
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/authn"
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/config"
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/keycloak"
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/server"
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/store"
+)
+
+// stubIssuer is a minimal OIDC issuer: discovery + JWKS + an RS256 signer.
+type stubIssuer struct {
+	URL  string
+	key  *rsa.PrivateKey
+	sign func(t *testing.T, claims map[string]any) string
+}
+
+func newStubIssuer(t *testing.T) *stubIssuer {
+	t.Helper()
+	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := &stubIssuer{key: key}
+
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+			"issuer":   s.URL,
+			"jwks_uri": s.URL + "/jwks",
+		})
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/jwks", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(jose.JSONWebKeySet{Keys: []jose.JSONWebKey{
+			{Key: key.Public(), KeyID: "test-kid", Algorithm: "RS256", Use: "sig"},
+		}})
+	})
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	s.URL = srv.URL
+
+	signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
+		jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: key},
+		(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithHeader("kid", "test-kid"),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.sign = func(t *testing.T, claims map[string]any) string {
+		t.Helper()
+		payload, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
+		jws, err := signer.Sign(payload)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		raw, err := jws.CompactSerialize()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return raw
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+func (s *stubIssuer) claims(overrides map[string]any) map[string]any {
+	c := map[string]any{
+		"iss": s.URL,
+		"aud": "tenant-registry",
+		"sub": "svc-account-1",
+		"azp": "compliance-svc",
+		"exp": time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute).Unix(),
+		"iat": time.Now().Unix(),
+	}
+	for k, v := range overrides {
+		c[k] = v
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+func TestVerifier(t *testing.T) {
+	iss := newStubIssuer(t)
+	v, err := authn.New(context.Background(), iss.URL, "tenant-registry")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
+	}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	t.Run("valid token yields principal", func(t *testing.T) {
+		p, err := v.Verify(ctx, "Bearer "+iss.sign(t, iss.claims(nil)))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
+		}
+		if p.Subject != "svc-account-1" || p.ClientID != "compliance-svc" || p.Issuer != iss.URL {
+			t.Errorf("principal wrong: %+v", p)
+		}
+	})
+
+	fail := func(name, header string) {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if _, err := v.Verify(ctx, header); err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("expected verification failure")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	fail("missing header", "")
+	fail("not bearer", "Basic abc")
+	fail("garbage token", "Bearer not.a.jwt")
+	fail("expired", "Bearer "+iss.sign(t, iss.claims(map[string]any{"exp": time.Now().Add(-time.Minute).Unix()})))
+	fail("wrong audience", "Bearer "+iss.sign(t, iss.claims(map[string]any{"aud": "someone-else"})))
+	fail("wrong issuer", "Bearer "+iss.sign(t, iss.claims(map[string]any{"iss": "https://evil.example"})))
+
+	t.Run("missing header is ErrNoToken", func(t *testing.T) {
+		if _, err := v.Verify(ctx, ""); err != authn.ErrNoToken {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrNoToken, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestNew_failsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := authn.New(context.Background(), "", "aud"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("empty issuer must error")
+	}
+	if _, err := authn.New(context.Background(), "http://127.0.0.1:1/realms/none", "aud"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unreachable issuer must error")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRouterGating proves the wiring: health stays PUBLIC_EXPLICIT, every
+// API route fails closed without a token, and a valid service token passes.
+func TestRouterGating(t *testing.T) {
+	iss := newStubIssuer(t)
+	v, err := authn.New(context.Background(), iss.URL, "tenant-registry")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
+	}
+	handler := server.NewRouter(&server.Server{
+		Cfg:      &config.Config{Env: "dev"},
+		Log:      slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)),
+		Store:    store.NewMemory(),
+		Keycloak: keycloak.NewMock(),
+		Auth:     v,
+	})
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(handler)
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	get := func(t *testing.T, path, authz string) (int, string) {
+		t.Helper()
+		req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+path, nil)
+		if authz != "" {
+			req.Header.Set("Authorization", authz)
+		}
+		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+		raw, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+		return resp.StatusCode, string(raw)
+	}
+
+	if code, _ := get(t, "/healthz", ""); code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("healthz must stay public, got %d", code)
+	}
+	if code, body := get(t, "/v1/catalog", ""); code != http.StatusUnauthorized || !strings.Contains(body, "TOKEN_MISSING") {
+		t.Errorf("no token: want 401 TOKEN_MISSING, got %d %s", code, body)
+	}
+	if code, body := get(t, "/v1/catalog", "Bearer junk"); code != http.StatusUnauthorized || !strings.Contains(body, "TOKEN_INVALID") {
+		t.Errorf("bad token: want 401 TOKEN_INVALID, got %d %s", code, body)
+	}
+	if code, _ := get(t, "/v1/catalog", "Bearer "+iss.sign(t, iss.claims(nil))); code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("valid token: want 200, got %d", code)
+	}
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ type Config struct {
 	KeycloakClientID     string
 	KeycloakClientSecret string
 	KeycloakTimeout      time.Duration
+
+	// Inbound API auth (RBAC Phase 1). With AuthEnabled the server refuses
+	// to start unless OIDC discovery against KeycloakIssuer succeeds, and
+	// every non-health route requires a bearer token whose audience
+	// contains AuthAudience.
+	AuthEnabled  bool
+	AuthAudience string
 }
 
 func Load() (*Config, error) {
@@ -39,6 +46,9 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
 		KeycloakClientID:     os.Getenv("KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID"),
 		KeycloakClientSecret: os.Getenv("KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET"),
 		KeycloakTimeout:      10 * time.Second,
+
+		AuthEnabled:  getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "false") == "true",
+		AuthAudience: getenv("AUTH_EXPECTED_AUDIENCE", "tenant-registry"),
 	}, nil
 }
 

internal/keycloak/adapter.go

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ var (
 	ErrOrgConflict  = errors.New("keycloak: organization already exists")
 	ErrUserConflict = errors.New("keycloak: user already exists")
 	ErrUnavailable  = errors.New("keycloak: unreachable")
+	ErrUserNotFound = errors.New("keycloak: user does not exist")
 )
 
 // InviteInput captures the per-tenant onboarding event from POST /v1/tenants.
@@ -73,6 +74,14 @@ type Adapter interface {
 	// flows, M14.x cancel, M12.x trial transitions).
 	SyncClaims(ctx context.Context, userID string, c Claims) error
 
+	// Memberships resolves the tenants user userID (the Keycloak user id,
+	// i.e. the JWT `sub`) belongs to, as Keycloak records them. The realm
+	// has no Organizations yet, so this reads the user's attribute
+	// projection — zero or one memberships. When the realm migrates to
+	// Organizations this becomes an org-membership query and callers keep
+	// working unchanged. Returns ErrUserNotFound for an unknown user id.
+	Memberships(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Claims, error)
+
 	// Health pings the admin endpoint. Used by readyz and the cluster cold-
 	// start sequence (INFRASTRUCTURE.md §10 scenario F).
 	Health(ctx context.Context) error

internal/keycloak/mock.go

@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ func (m *Mock) CreateOrgAndInvite(_ context.Context, in InviteInput) (*InviteRes
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// Memberships returns the last-synced Claims for userID as its single
+// membership, mirroring the attribute-projection behavior of the real
+// adapter. Unknown users yield ErrUserNotFound.
+func (m *Mock) Memberships(_ context.Context, userID string) ([]Claims, error) {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	if m.FailNext != nil {
+		err := m.FailNext
+		m.FailNext = nil
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	c, ok := m.Claims[userID]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, ErrUserNotFound
+	}
+	return []Claims{c}, nil
+}
+
 func (m *Mock) SyncClaims(_ context.Context, userID string, c Claims) error {
 	m.mu.Lock()
 	defer m.mu.Unlock()

internal/keycloak/users.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package keycloak
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// userRepresentation is the slice of the Admin API's UserRepresentation we
+// need. Attributes arrive as map[name][]values; the KC admin console writes
+// multivalued attributes either as separate list entries or as one entry
+// joined with "##", so both shapes must be accepted.
+type userRepresentation struct {
+	ID         string              `json:"id"`
+	Username   string              `json:"username"`
+	Enabled    bool                `json:"enabled"`
+	Attributes map[string][]string `json:"attributes"`
+}
+
+// Memberships implements Adapter against GET /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{id}.
+func (a *HTTPAdapter) Memberships(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Claims, error) {
+	var u userRepresentation
+	resp, err := a.adminCall(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/users/"+userID, nil, &u)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
+		_ = resp.Body.Close()
+		return nil, ErrUserNotFound
+	}
+	if resp.StatusCode/100 != 2 {
+		_ = resp.Body.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keycloak get user: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	return claimsFromAttributes(u.Attributes), nil
+}
+
+// claimsFromAttributes builds the membership list from a user's attribute
+// projection. A user with no tenant_id and no tenant_slug attribute simply
+// has no memberships — that is a valid state, not an error.
+func claimsFromAttributes(attrs map[string][]string) []Claims {
+	c := Claims{
+		TenantID:     attrValue(attrs, "tenant_id"),
+		TenantSlug:   attrValue(attrs, "tenant_slug"),
+		OrgRoles:     attrValues(attrs, "org_roles"),
+		Products:     attrValues(attrs, "products"),
+		Plan:         attrValue(attrs, "plan"),
+		TenantStatus: attrValue(attrs, "tenant_status"),
+	}
+	if c.TenantID == "" && c.TenantSlug == "" {
+		return []Claims{}
+	}
+	return []Claims{c}
+}
+
+func attrValue(attrs map[string][]string, key string) string {
+	if vs := attrValues(attrs, key); len(vs) > 0 {
+		return vs[0]
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func attrValues(attrs map[string][]string, key string) []string {
+	out := []string{}
+	for _, entry := range attrs[key] {
+		for _, v := range strings.Split(entry, "##") {
+			if v = strings.TrimSpace(v); v != "" {
+				out = append(out, v)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}

internal/keycloak/users_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+package keycloak
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// stubUsersKC is a users-endpoint-only KC look-alike; stubKC (client_test.go)
+// covers the org/invite paths and doesn't register GET /users/{id}.
+func stubUsersKC(t *testing.T, users map[string]userRepresentation) *httptest.Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("/realms/test-realm/protocol/openid-connect/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"access_token": "test-token", "expires_in": 60})
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /admin/realms/test-realm/users/{id}", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		u, ok := users[r.PathValue("id")]
+		if !ok {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"User not found"}`))
+			return
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(u)
+	})
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	return srv
+}
+
+func usersAdapter(srv *httptest.Server) *HTTPAdapter {
+	return NewHTTPAdapter(HTTPConfig{
+		BaseURL: srv.URL, Realm: "test-realm", ClientID: "svc", ClientSecret: "secret",
+	})
+}
+
+func TestHTTPAdapter_Memberships(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := stubUsersKC(t, map[string]userRepresentation{
+		"u-1": {ID: "u-1", Username: "test@breakpilot.com", Enabled: true, Attributes: map[string][]string{
+			"tenant_id":     {"acme-001"},
+			"tenant_slug":   {"acme"},
+			"tenant_status": {"active"},
+			"plan":          {"Scale"},
+			"org_roles":     {"IT_ADMIN", "FINANCE"},
+			// the KC admin console writes multivalued attrs "##"-joined
+			"products": {"compliance##certifai"},
+		}},
+		"u-2": {ID: "u-2", Username: "bare@breakpilot.com", Enabled: true},
+	})
+	a := usersAdapter(srv)
+
+	t.Run("attribute projection becomes one membership", func(t *testing.T) {
+		got, err := a.Memberships(context.Background(), "u-1")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("memberships: %v", err)
+		}
+		if len(got) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("want 1 membership, got %d", len(got))
+		}
+		c := got[0]
+		if c.TenantID != "acme-001" || c.TenantSlug != "acme" || c.Plan != "Scale" || c.TenantStatus != "active" {
+			t.Errorf("scalar claims wrong: %+v", c)
+		}
+		if len(c.OrgRoles) != 2 || c.OrgRoles[0] != "IT_ADMIN" || c.OrgRoles[1] != "FINANCE" {
+			t.Errorf("org_roles wrong: %v", c.OrgRoles)
+		}
+		if len(c.Products) != 2 || c.Products[0] != "compliance" || c.Products[1] != "certifai" {
+			t.Errorf("## split failed: %v", c.Products)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("user without tenant attributes has zero memberships", func(t *testing.T) {
+		got, err := a.Memberships(context.Background(), "u-2")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("memberships: %v", err)
+		}
+		if len(got) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("want 0 memberships, got %+v", got)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("unknown user is ErrUserNotFound", func(t *testing.T) {
+		_, err := a.Memberships(context.Background(), "nope")
+		if !errors.Is(err, ErrUserNotFound) {
+			t.Fatalf("want ErrUserNotFound, got %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestMock_Memberships(t *testing.T) {
+	m := NewMock()
+	if _, err := m.Memberships(context.Background(), "ghost"); !errors.Is(err, ErrUserNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("want ErrUserNotFound, got %v", err)
+	}
+	want := Claims{TenantSlug: "acme", OrgRoles: []string{"IT_ADMIN"}}
+	m.Claims["u-1"] = want
+	got, err := m.Memberships(context.Background(), "u-1")
+	if err != nil || len(got) != 1 || got[0].TenantSlug != "acme" {
+		t.Fatalf("got %+v err %v", got, err)
+	}
+}

internal/server/server.go

@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@
 package server
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/authn"
 	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/config"
 	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/keycloak"
 	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/store"
@@ -19,15 +21,24 @@ type Server struct {
 	Log      *slog.Logger
 	Store    store.Store
 	Keycloak keycloak.Adapter // never nil — main wires Mock when KC env is unset
+	Auth     *authn.Verifier  // nil ⇒ AUTH_ENABLED=false, API is open (dev only)
 }
 
 // NewRouter builds the http.Handler with logging middleware applied.
+//
+// Route auth classes (ratified auth design): /healthz and /readyz are
+// PUBLIC_EXPLICIT (orca probes, no auth by design); every other route is
+// INTERNAL_SERVICE_ONLY and sits behind requireAuth. New routes land in
+// the protected mux by construction — registering one on the root mux is
+// the exception and needs a PUBLIC_EXPLICIT justification comment.
 func NewRouter(s *Server) http.Handler {
-	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	root := http.NewServeMux()
 
-	// health + status
+	// PUBLIC_EXPLICIT: health + status probes.
-	mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", s.healthz)
+	root.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", s.healthz)
-	mux.HandleFunc("GET /readyz", s.readyz)
+	root.HandleFunc("GET /readyz", s.readyz)
+
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 
 	// tenants
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/tenants", s.createTenant)
@@ -60,7 +71,35 @@ func NewRouter(s *Server) http.Handler {
 	// the "pull" complement for when the realm is reconfigured to fetch.
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/internal/keycloak/claims", s.kcClaims)
 
-	return logRequest(s.Log)(mux)
+	// memberships — the B2 membership authority: which tenants does a
+	// JWT subject belong to, with which org_roles and entitlements.
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /v1/users/{id}/memberships", s.getUserMemberships)
+
+	root.Handle("/", s.requireAuth(mux))
+	return logRequest(s.Log)(root)
+}
+
+// requireAuth gates the INTERNAL_SERVICE_ONLY routes. With Auth nil
+// (AUTH_ENABLED=false) it passes through — the startup log carries the
+// warning, and the Auth-5 activation flips the env, not the code.
+func (s *Server) requireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	if s.Auth == nil {
+		return next
+	}
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		p, err := s.Auth.Verify(r.Context(), r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+		if err != nil {
+			if errors.Is(err, authn.ErrNoToken) {
+				writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "TOKEN_MISSING", "bearer token required")
+				return
+			}
+			// Signature, issuer, expiry, and audience failures all land
+			// here; the message says which without echoing the token.
+			writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "TOKEN_INVALID", err.Error())
+			return
+		}
+		next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(authn.WithPrincipal(r.Context(), p)))
+	})
 }
 
 func (s *Server) healthz(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {

internal/server/users.go

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/keycloak"
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/store"
+)
+
+// membershipItem is one tenant a user belongs to. Source records which
+// system produced the authoritative half: "registry" when the tenant exists
+// here (status/plan/products come from our tables), "keycloak" when only
+// the attribute projection knows it (e.g. a tenant seeded directly in the
+// realm that the registry has not onboarded yet).
+type membershipItem struct {
+	keycloak.Claims
+	Source string `json:"source"`
+}
+
+type membershipsResp struct {
+	UserID      string           `json:"user_id"`
+	Memberships []membershipItem `json:"memberships"`
+}
+
+// getUserMemberships is GET /v1/users/{id}/memberships — the membership
+// authority endpoint (ratified auth design, model B2). Product backends
+// call it to answer "which tenants does this JWT subject belong to, with
+// which roles", instead of trusting token claims or client headers.
+//
+// Resolution: Keycloak (via the Adapter) supplies user→tenant links and
+// org_roles; where the tenant is registered here, status, plan, and
+// product entitlements are overridden from the registry tables, which are
+// authoritative for lifecycle and billing state.
+func (s *Server) getUserMemberships(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	userID := r.PathValue("id")
+	if userID == "" {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_input", "user id required")
+		return
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	claims, err := s.Keycloak.Memberships(ctx, userID)
+	if err != nil {
+		switch {
+		case errors.Is(err, keycloak.ErrUserNotFound):
+			writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "user does not exist")
+		case errors.Is(err, keycloak.ErrUnavailable), errors.Is(err, keycloak.ErrUnauthorized):
+			writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "keycloak_unavailable", err.Error())
+		default:
+			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", err.Error())
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	items := make([]membershipItem, 0, len(claims))
+	for _, c := range claims {
+		items = append(items, s.enrichMembership(ctx, c))
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, membershipsResp{UserID: userID, Memberships: items})
+}
+
+// enrichMembership overrides the Keycloak attribute projection with
+// registry truth when the tenant is known here. Lookup prefers the slug —
+// the attribute tenant_id predates the registry for hand-seeded dev users
+// and may not be a registry id.
+func (s *Server) enrichMembership(ctx context.Context, c keycloak.Claims) membershipItem {
+	var (
+		t   *store.Tenant
+		err error
+	)
+	if c.TenantSlug != "" {
+		t, err = s.Store.GetTenantBySlug(ctx, c.TenantSlug)
+	} else {
+		t, err = s.Store.GetTenant(ctx, c.TenantID)
+	}
+	if err != nil || t == nil {
+		return membershipItem{Claims: c, Source: "keycloak"}
+	}
+
+	products := []string{}
+	if tps, perr := s.Store.ListTenantProducts(ctx, t.ID); perr == nil {
+		for _, p := range tps {
+			if p.Enabled {
+				products = append(products, p.Product)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return membershipItem{
+		Claims: keycloak.Claims{
+			TenantID:     t.ID,
+			TenantSlug:   t.Slug,
+			OrgRoles:     c.OrgRoles, // roles stay Keycloak-owned
+			Products:     products,
+			Plan:         t.Plan,
+			TenantStatus: t.Status,
+		},
+		Source: "registry",
+	}
+}

internal/server/users_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package server_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.meghsakha.com/platform/tenant-registry/internal/keycloak"
+)
+
+type membershipsBody struct {
+	UserID      string `json:"user_id"`
+	Memberships []struct {
+		keycloak.Claims
+		Source string `json:"source"`
+	} `json:"memberships"`
+}
+
+func TestGetUserMemberships(t *testing.T) {
+	eachStore(t, func(t *testing.T, h *testHarness) {
+		// The KC attribute projection carries a stale plan/status and a
+		// legacy tenant_id — the registry row must win (source: registry).
+		h.kcMock.Claims["u-1"] = keycloak.Claims{
+			TenantID: "kc-legacy-id", TenantSlug: "acme",
+			OrgRoles: []string{"IT_ADMIN"}, Plan: "stale-plan", TenantStatus: "stale",
+		}
+		resp, raw := h.do(http.MethodGet, "/v1/users/u-1/memberships", nil)
+		if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, raw)
+		}
+		body := decode[membershipsBody](t, raw)
+		if body.UserID != "u-1" || len(body.Memberships) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected body: %s", raw)
+		}
+		m := body.Memberships[0]
+		if m.Source != "registry" {
+			t.Errorf("want source registry, got %q", m.Source)
+		}
+		if m.TenantID != h.tenant.ID || m.TenantSlug != "acme" {
+			t.Errorf("registry identity not authoritative: %+v", m.Claims)
+		}
+		if m.Plan != h.tenant.Plan || m.TenantStatus != h.tenant.Status {
+			t.Errorf("registry lifecycle not authoritative: plan=%q status=%q", m.Plan, m.TenantStatus)
+		}
+		if len(m.OrgRoles) != 1 || m.OrgRoles[0] != "IT_ADMIN" {
+			t.Errorf("org_roles must stay keycloak-owned: %v", m.OrgRoles)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestGetUserMemberships_unknownTenantFallsBackToKeycloak(t *testing.T) {
+	eachStore(t, func(t *testing.T, h *testHarness) {
+		h.kcMock.Claims["u-2"] = keycloak.Claims{
+			TenantID: "ghost-001", TenantSlug: "ghost",
+			OrgRoles: []string{"USER"}, Plan: "Scale", TenantStatus: "active",
+		}
+		resp, raw := h.do(http.MethodGet, "/v1/users/u-2/memberships", nil)
+		if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, raw)
+		}
+		m := decode[membershipsBody](t, raw).Memberships[0]
+		if m.Source != "keycloak" || m.TenantSlug != "ghost" || m.Plan != "Scale" {
+			t.Errorf("expected untouched keycloak projection, got %+v (source %q)", m.Claims, m.Source)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestGetUserMemberships_unknownUser404(t *testing.T) {
+	eachStore(t, func(t *testing.T, h *testHarness) {
+		resp, _ := h.do(http.MethodGet, "/v1/users/nobody/memberships", nil)
+		if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
+			t.Fatalf("want 404, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+		}
+	})
+}

openapi.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ info:
     `PLATFORM_ARCHITECTURE.md §5c` for the schema, and
     `PRODUCT_INTEGRATION_SPEC.md §8.4` for the audit shape.
 
-    This API is not yet authenticated — M4.3 adds Keycloak JWT validation.
+    Auth (RBAC Phase 1): with AUTH_ENABLED=true every route except
+    /healthz and /readyz requires a Keycloak-issued bearer token whose
+    audience contains AUTH_EXPECTED_AUDIENCE (INTERNAL_SERVICE_ONLY
+    posture). With AUTH_ENABLED=false (dev default) the API is open.
   contact:
     email: oncall@breakpilot.com
   license:
@@ -250,6 +253,49 @@ paths:
           description: Revoked.
         "404": { $ref: "#/components/responses/NotFound" }
 
+  /v1/users/{id}/memberships:
+    get:
+      summary: Resolve which tenants a user belongs to (membership authority).
+      description: |
+        The B2 membership-authority endpoint (ratified compliance auth
+        design). Product backends call this with the JWT `sub` instead of
+        trusting token claims or client-supplied headers. Keycloak supplies
+        the user→tenant links and org_roles; where the tenant is registered
+        here, tenant_status / plan / products are overridden from registry
+        tables (source: "registry"), otherwise the Keycloak attribute
+        projection is returned as-is (source: "keycloak").
+      parameters:
+        - name: id
+          in: path
+          required: true
+          description: Keycloak user id (the JWT `sub`).
+          schema: { type: string }
+      responses:
+        "200":
+          description: Memberships (possibly empty) for the user.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [user_id, memberships]
+                properties:
+                  user_id: { type: string }
+                  memberships:
+                    type: array
+                    items:
+                      allOf:
+                        - $ref: "#/components/schemas/Claims"
+                        - type: object
+                          required: [source]
+                          properties:
+                            source: { type: string, enum: [registry, keycloak] }
+        "400": { $ref: "#/components/responses/BadRequest" }
+        "404": { $ref: "#/components/responses/NotFound" }
+        "503":
+          description: Keycloak unreachable — membership cannot be resolved.
+          content:
+            application/json: { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } }
+
   /v1/internal/keycloak/claims:
     post:
       summary: Resolve the up-to-date claim bundle for a user/tenant.
@@ -356,6 +402,15 @@ paths:
         "400": { $ref: "#/components/responses/BadRequest" }
 
 components:
+  securitySchemes:
+    bearerAuth:
+      type: http
+      scheme: bearer
+      bearerFormat: JWT
+      description: |
+        Keycloak-issued token (client_credentials for services). Enforced
+        on all non-health routes when AUTH_ENABLED=true.
+
   responses:
     BadRequest:
       description: Input failed validation.